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Abstract
Option valuation models are usually based on frictionless markets. This paper extends and
complements the literature by developing a model of option pricing in which the derivative
and/or the underlying asset have an oligopolistic market structure, which produces an expected
return on these assets that exceeds (or goes below) their fundamental value, and hence aﬀects
the option valuation. Our formulation begins modeling a capital asset pricing model that takes
into account an oligopolistic setting, and hence the standard option pricing formula is derived,
but this time considering the level of market power into the model. Our results show that
higher levels of market power will lower the required expected return, in comparison to the
perfectly competitive CAPM model. Similarly, simulations show that higher levels of market
power in the derivative markets tend to increase the call option values in comparison to those
values given by the standard Black and Scholes formulation, while the impact of market power
in the underlying asset market tends to lower the option price.
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1 Introduction
[4] and [14] in their seminal works showed that the construction of a risk-less hedge between the
option and its underlying asset, allows the derivation of an option pricing formula regardless of
investors risk preferences. In these derivations, it is assumed that taxes and transaction costs
are zero, and that the market works perfectly, or in other words, that the capital asset pricing
applies at each instant of time. The main advantages of the Black–Scholes model are that their
formula is a function of “observable” variables and that the model can be extended to the pricing
of any type of option. Thus, the Black and Scholes model has been extended since the seventies
by several authors to account for other observable variables and to tackle several financial issues1.
Nevertheless, all this literature has been constructed assuming frictionless markets and the absence
of market power.
[9] was one of the first authors to point out that the impact of market imperfections on option
pricing could be large and that could be even larger than many researchers had realized. He found
that, in actual markets such as the stock index options, the standard arbitrage is exposed to such
large risk and transactions costs that only very wide bounds on equilibrium options prices can be
established. This evidence has important implications for price determination in options markets,
as well as for the testing of valuation models. Consequently, it is important to take into account
that option arbitrage could account for some kind of market imperfections.
Much more recently, [5] reported widespread violations of stochastic dominance by 1-month
S&P 500 index call options over the period 1986–2006. They pointed out that a trader can
improve expected utility by engaging in a zero net-cost trading net of transaction costs and bid-
ask spread. They also found that although pre-crash option prices conform to the Black-Scholes
model reasonably well, they are incorrectly priced if the distribution of the index return is estimated
from time-series data.
Additionally to the academic works discussed above, even though today most financial markets
are characterized by high levels of competition (with players relatively well-financed and well-
informed), the behavior of some financial instruments suggests the existence of diﬀerent kinds
of market imperfections. Indeed, adverse selection, iliquidity, transaction costs, and the level of
market competition are all problems that have been discussed in the academic literature, especially
in light of the recent financial crises. Market power issues, such as oligopolistic competition in
financial markets, are much less common in the academic literature. Despite this, in practice,
some financial markets present important levels of concentration. For instance, derivatives activity
in the U.S. banking system is dominated by a small group of large financial institutions. The OCC’s
quarterly report on trading revenues and bank derivatives activities 2, in his Fourth Quarter 2012
issue, points out that the top 4 banks in the US (i.e. JP Morgan Chase Bank, Bank of America,
Citibank, and Goldman Sachs Bank) account for a very important part of the derivative risk in the
financial system. Specifically, as shown in Table 1, of the $223 trillion in gross notional amount of
derivative contracts, just 4 banks account for 93.2% of all derivative contracts.
1See [6], [10], [17] and [3] for some complete reviews of these extensions.
2This report is based on Call Report information provided by all insured U.S. commercial banks and trust
companies, reports filed by U.S. financial holding companies, and other published data.
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Table 1. Concentration of Derivative Contracts - 4th Quarter 2012 ($ in Billions)
Derivative Contracts Top 4 Bks Top Derivs All Other Bks Tot Derivs All Bks Tot Derivs
Futures & Fwds 39,006 17.5% 4,437 2.0% 43,443 19.5%
Swaps 126,773 56.8% 8,165 3.7% 134,938 60.5%
Options 29,669 13.3% 1,884 0.8% 31,553 14.1%
Credit Derivatives 12,605 5.6% 585 0.3% 13,190 5.9%
Total 208,053 93.2% 15,071 6.8% 223,124 100%
Source: OCC’s quarterly report on trading revenues and bank derivatives activities
One of the first symptoms of market failures in financial markets is the miss-pricing regarding
the risk-based valuation. Considering homogeneous information and perfect competition the capital
assets pricing models will usually apply, however, in the presence of market imperfection capital
assets pricing models will eventually produce an expected return on these assets that may exceed
(go below) their fundamental value. This abnormal return can be econometrically estimated taking
into account the deviations from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as presented by [16], [13]
and [15] or any other multi-factor asset pricing model, e.g.[8].
For instance, [2] studied the relationship between risk and returns under imperfect competition.
They argue that when the model of expected returns is based on imperfect competition, the level
of market competition and the degree of adverse selection aﬀects asset prices in conjunction with
market risk. In their empirical model, they use Fama and French three-factors model on a database
of firms sort into five quintiles, such that firms in the fifth quartile have the most shareholders
and therefore the greatest degree of market competition. Each portfolio contained an average of
949 firm months over period 1976 to 2006. They found a modest eﬀect on the level of market
competition on expected returns, and also find that expected returns were increasing in the degree
of adverse selection when there is a relatively low degree of market competition. Collectively, their
results suggest that while it may be appropriate to characterize capital markets as a whole by
standard asset-pricing models based on price-taking behavior, there exist sub-markets within the
wider capital market that are better characterized by imperfect competition. In a similar paper, [12]
analyze the role of information in pricing and cost of capital in securities markets characterized by
imperfect competition among investors. They found that imperfect competition results in markets
being less than perfectly liquid. Their analysis shows that the interaction between illiquid markets
and asymmetric information gives rise to a role for information in estimating the cost of capital that
is absent in perfect competition settings such as the CAPM. In terms of liquidity risk, [1] develop
a simple liquidity adjusted CAPM, where a security’s required return depends on its expected
liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return
and liquidity. The model provides a framework for understanding the various channels through
which liquidity risk may aﬀect asset prices. Their empirical results shed light on the total and
relative economic significance of these channels and provide evidence of flight to liquidity. Finally,
another related application associating CAPM with option pricing in a context of incomplete
markets is provided by[11]. Specifically, they consider the case of an option on an arbitrary asset
in an incomplete lognormal market and analyse the situation in which the planning horizon of
the individual investor is shorter than the time-to-maturity of the option. Their derived pricing
equations depend explicitly on the planning horizon of the individual investor.
This paper extends and complements the depicted stream of literature by developing a model
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of option pricing in which the derivative and/or the underlying asset have an oligopolistic market
structure, which produces an expected return on these assets that exceeds (or goes below) their
fundamental value, and hence aﬀects the option valuation. Our formulation begins modeling a
CAPM that takes into account an oligopolistic setting, and thus the standard option pricing formula
is derived, but this time considering the level of market power into the model. This ensures that
the results are easy to use in practice. In particular, financial analysts could find useful and benefit
from an option pricing model that admits some type of disequilibrium, in terms for example of
abnormal returns in the derivative and underlying assets markets, specially considering market
power as a consequence of an oligopolistic market structure.
This paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the basic model is presented. Secondly, some nu-
merical illustrations are developed in order to quantify the potential impact of market imperfections
in the option valuation model. Finally, some conclusions and further research are outlined.
2 The Model Formulation
In this section, an oligopolistic option pricing model is developed, using a CAPM that captures this
kind of market structure. First, an oligopolistic CAPM is put forward, and second the implications
of such formulation for the derivative and/or the underlying asset markets are taken into account
in the development of our oligopolistic option pricing model.
2.1 Capital Asset Pricing Model in an Oligopolistic Setting
Let us assume a market composed by m investors and n assets. Each investor will determine
his/her portfolio. The portfolio return for the investor i is defined as:
rip =
nX
j
 
xijrj
 
(1)
where xij is the fraction of the wealth of the investor i, invested in asset j; and r¯j is the expected
value of the asset return. The portfolio variance is defined as:
var(rip) =
nX
j
nX
k
 
xijx
i
k jk
 
(2)
being  jk = cov(rj , rk).
Traditionally, each investor wants to minimize the variance of the portfolio return subject to
a specified expected return for its portfolio R¯i, and at the same time considering his/her budget
constraint, in this case
Pn
j x
i
j = 1. It is well known that one of the results of this problem is the
standard form of the CAPM.
Now, let us assume an oligopolistic structure in the financial market of asset j, in which there
are only a few participants that demand the asset, maintaining diﬀerent levels of market power.
It is assumed that investor i has the ability to individually aﬀect the prevailing market price by
modifying the demanded quantity of asset j in the market. Specifically, we will assume that there
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is a positive relationship between the volume of the demanded asset in the market and its price,
in other words, an inverse demand function, of the form:
P (Xj) = P¯ 1j + ✓jXj (3)
where, P (Xj) is the market price of asset j, P¯ 1j is the expected price of asset j in the next period
assuming a perfectly competitive setting (reflecting exactly its true fundamental value), ✓j is a
measure of the market power, or how the price is aﬀected by the volume of assets demanded,
and Xj represents the demanded quantity of asset j in the market. In this very simple demand
equation, it is clear that a positive and greater ✓j implies e a more elastic market. Moreover, given
the positive slope of the demand curve, more elastic here means that when the price of the asset
goes up, the demand for the asset will be greater than in the case of a more inelastic asset market.
Xj is equivalent to the total amount of money invested in asset j by all investors, divided by
the the current price of the asset:
Pm
i (xijwi)
P 0j
, where wi represent the initial wealth of investor i.
Hence, the demand function becomes:
P (Xj) = P¯ 1j + ✓j
Pm
i
 
xijw
i
 
P 0j
(4)
In this context, the return of asset j is given by:
r¯j =
P¯ 1j
P 0j
+
✓j
(P 0j )
2
mX
i
 
xijw
i
   1 (5)
where P 0j is the current price of asset j. Finally, in a more compact form, the expected return of
an asset in an oligopolistic setting is:
r¯j = ✓
’
j
mX
i
 
xijw
i
 
+ r0j (6)
where ✓’j =
✓j
(P0j )
2 and r0j is equivalent to the return of the asset in a competitive market r0j =
P¯ 1j
P 0j
 1.
From equation 6 it is clear that when there is not market power ✓j = 0, the return of the asset
equals the percentage change of prices as it is common in competitive markets.
Thus, the investor’s problem is given by:
min
nX
j
nX
k
 
xijx
i
k jk
 
s.t.
nX
j
xij
 
✓’j
mX
i
 
xijw
i
 
+ r0j
!
= R¯i
nX
j
xij = 1 (7)
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The Lagrangian, of the ith investor, associated with this problem is:
Li =
nX
j
nX
k
 
xijx
i
k jk
    i
0@ nX
j
xij
 
✓’j
mX
i
 
xijw
i
 
+ r0j
!
  R¯i
1A  µi
0@ nX
j
xij   1
1A (8)
where  iand µi are the Lagrange’s multipliers.
Given that our decision variable is the percentage of wealth invested in each asset, the first
order condition of the problem, for investor i and asset j, takes the form:
@Li
@xij
= 2
nX
k
 
xik jk
    i
0@ nX
j
xij
1A ✓’jwi    i✓’j mX
i
 
xijw
i
    ir0j   µi = 0
= 2
nX
k
 
xik jk
    ixij✓’jwi    i  r¯j   r0j    ir0j   µi = 0
= 2
nX
k
 
xik jk
    i  xij✓’jwi + r¯j   µi = 0 (9)
Equations 9 must be fulfilled by all of the n assets and represent the best response functions
of each investor. Clearly, as it is common in oligopolistic markets, the optimum decision of player
i depends upon the decision of other players, represented implicitly in r¯j .
In order to solve the system in terms of  i and µi, we assume that there are only two assets in
which to invest: a risk free asset and a “mutual fund”, that invest in all the assets in the market
(this asset is known to be mean-variance eﬃcient). It is worth noting that for this portfolio of two
assets, the first-order condition becomes:
2 jk    i
 
xij✓
’
jw
i + r¯j
   µi = 0
• If the asset j is risk-free (f) we obtain:
  i  xif✓’fwi + r¯f  = µi (10)
• If the asset j is a market portfolio (M) we get:
2 2M    i
 
xiM✓
’
Mw
i + ¯rM
 
= µi (11)
Solving (10) and (11) for  i, we have:
  i  xif✓’fwi + r¯f  = 2 2M    i  xiM✓’Mwi + ¯rM 
 i =
2 2Mh
( ¯rM   r¯f ) + (xiM✓’Mwi   xif✓’fwi)
i (12)
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replacing  i in (10)
µi =  
2 2M
⇣
xif✓
’
fw
i + r¯f
⌘
h
( ¯rM   r¯f ) + (xiM✓’Mwi   xif✓’fwi)
i (13)
Finally, using equations (9), (12) , (13)we get:
2 jk  2 
2
Mh
( ¯rM   r¯f ) + (xiM✓’Mwi   xif✓’fwi)
i  xij✓’jwi + r¯j + 2 2M
⇣
xif✓
’
fw
i + r¯f
⌘
h
( ¯rM   r¯f ) + (xiM✓’Mwi   xif✓’fwi)
i = 0
2 jk
⇥
( ¯rM   r¯f ) + (xiM✓’Mwi   xif✓’fwi)
⇤  2 2M  xij✓’jwi + r¯j + 2 2M  xif✓’fwi + r¯f  = 0
r¯j =  j
⇥
( ¯rM   r¯f ) + (xiM✓’Mwi   xif✓’fwi)
⇤
+
⇥  xij✓’jwi + xif✓’fwi + r¯f ⇤
Hence we can obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1: For any asset j, the basic formula for an oligopolistic capital asset pricing
model is given by:
r¯j =  j
 
¯rM   r¯f + ↵1j
 
+ r¯f + ↵
2
j
where the beta of asset j is:  j =  jM/ 2M , ↵1j =
⇣
xiM✓
’
Mw
i   xif✓’fwi
⌘
and ↵2j =
h
xif✓
’
fw
i   xij✓’jwi
i
.
Compared with the traditional CAPM model, oligopolistic behavior implies two distinct eﬀects.
First, there is a risk premium associated with oligopolistic market power, ↵1j , analogous to the risk
premium of a perfectly competitive market, but now given by the diﬀerence between the percentage
eﬀect of the money invested in the market portfolio asset and the percentage eﬀect of the money
invested in the risk free asset, instead of the returns as in the perfectly competitive case. As
pointed out above, the term ✓ is related to the price elasticity of demand, the lower this parameter
the more elastic the market. In our oligopolistic model of the asset market, each additional unit of
idiosyncratic risk is rewarded with a risk premium of market power, which depends positively upon
the amount of money expended in the market portfolio and negatively in terms of investments in
the risk free asset. Furthermore, there is an additional rate, ↵2j , that grows with investments in
the risk free asset and that decreases with investments in the same evaluated asset.
From proposition 1, we can infer the following Corollary:
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Corollary 1: Assuming perfect competition in the risk free asset market and in the mutual
fund market, in other words assuming no market power i.e. ✓’f = 0 and ✓’M = 0, we obtain the
following asset pricing equation:
r¯j =  j ( ¯rM   r¯f ) + r¯f   ✓’jxijwi (14)
r¯j =  j ( ¯rM   r¯f ) + r¯f   ↵j (15)
where ↵j =
 
✓’jx
i
jw
i
 
.
It is clear that more investment in the asset with market power, and more market power, imply
a lower return valuation for the asset. The alpha term represents the level of market power, that is,
the ability of big firms to influence market prices. In other words, two assets with the same intrinsic
risk, the market with more market power will have lower levels of returns. This is consistent with
the three factor model of Fama and French, in which size matters at the time of evaluating returns,
and that empirically small cap and value portfolios imply higher expected returns [7]. Finally, in
the absence of market power, equation 14 will collapse into the traditional CAPM. Consequently,
even in this simplified case, the oligopolistic model is diﬀerent to that of the traditional CAPM
valuation.
2.2 The Oligopolistic Option Pricing Model
Following [4], the problem is stated as follows: let t be time and St be the price of stock. Consider
a derivative security whose price depends on S and t, so we call it ⇡(S, t) or just ⇡. Then, the task
becomes to find the equation which ⇡ satisfies. First, we assume that there is a risk-free bond B
which earns a risk-free rate r.
dB = rBdt (16)
In addition, we assume that the stock price St follows the geometric Brownian motion:
dS = µSdt +  Sdz (17)
Regarding the derivative ⇡(S, t), by Ito’s lemma, the following holds:
d⇡ = (
@⇡
@t
+ µS
@⇡
@S
+
1
2
 2S2⇡ss)dt +  S
@⇡
@S
dz (18)
We rearrange using 17 and obtain:
d⇡ =
@⇡
@S
dS + (
@⇡
@t
+
1
2
 2S2
@2⇡
@S2
)dt (19)
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Hence:
d⇡
⇡
=
S
⇡
@⇡
@S
dS
S
+
1
⇡
✓
@⇡
@t
+
1
2
 2S2
@2⇡
@S2
◆
dt (20)
If we assume that the value of ↵ is diﬀerent to zero, as a product of market power, we have:
r¯S = E
✓
dS
S
◆
=  Spdt+ r¯fdt  ↵Sdt (21)
r¯⇡ = E
✓
d⇡
⇡
◆
=  ⇡pdt+ r¯fdt  ↵⇡dt (22)
where p = ¯rM   r¯f and ↵j =
 
✓’jx
i
jw
i
 
. The alpha term can be interpreted as the level of market
power, i.e. the ability of big firms to influence market prices. As pointed out by [4], the following
relation between the derivative’s betas  ⇡ and the stock’s betas  S holds:
 ⇡ =
S
⇡
@⇡
@S
 S (23)
The coeﬃcient S⇡
@⇡
@S can be interpreted as the “elasticity” of the derivative price with respect
to the stock price, in other words, it is the ratio of the percentage change in the derivative price
to the percentage change in the stock price, for small percentage changes.
Using 23 and 22 and multiplying both sides by ⇡ we obtain:
E(d⇡) = S
@⇡
@S
 Spdt+ r¯f⇡dt  ↵⇡⇡dt (24)
Taking the expected value of 19 and now using 21 we get:
E(d⇡) = Sr¯f
@⇡
@S
dt  S↵S @⇡
@S
dt+ S
@⇡
@S
 Spdt+
@⇡
@t
dt+
1
2
 2S2
@2⇡
@S2
dt (25)
Combining 24 and 25 we have:
S
@⇡
@S
 Sp+ r¯f⇡   ↵⇡⇡ = Sr¯f @⇡
@S
  S↵S @⇡
@S
+ S
@⇡
@S
 Sp+
@⇡
@t
+
1
2
 2S2
@2⇡
@S2
(26)
After rearranging, we finally obtain the following result:
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Proposition 2: An extended version of the Black & Scholes equation that takes into account
market imperfections, through the potential abnormal returns in the stock and derivative markets
is given by:
@⇡
@t
+ S
@⇡
@S
[r¯f   ↵S ] + 1
2
 2S2
@2⇡
@S2
= ⇡ [r¯f   ↵⇡] . (27)
It transpires that when ↵S and ↵⇡ are zero 27 becomes the traditional Black & Scholes equation.
It is interesting to note that there is not any factor in the equation that allows the quantification
of the trade-oﬀ between risk and expected return, being still a formulation in which the risk of
the investor is not relevant. On the one hand, when deviations of the state of equilibrium are
considered, as a product of some market imperfections, such as the ones discussed in the introduc-
tion; the classical non-arbitrage assumption of the Black-Scholes model is violated, implying a non
risk-free portfolio. On the other hand, the impact of market imperfections implies marks-up in the
derivative and stock markets that are asymmetric. Indeed, while ↵⇡ tends to increase the value of
the call, ↵S goes in opposite direction, decreasing the call’s price.
The following call option pricing result can be established from our extended Black & Scholes
formulation.
Proposition 3: For a call option, with T as maturity date and K as the strike price, we use
the following contract function  (S):
 (S) =
⇢
0 0 < S < K
S  K K < S
The Extended Black-Scholes solution ⇡(S, t,↵⇡,↵S) is given by
⇡(S, t) = Se(↵⇡ ↵S)(T t)N(d1) Ke (r¯f ↵⇡)(T t)N(d2)
where
d1(S, t) =
ln SK + (r¯f +
 2
2   ↵S)(T   t)
 
p
(T   t)
d2(S, t) = d1    
p
T   t
and N(x) is the normal distribution function N(0, 1).
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Finally, the comparative statics of our extended Black-Scholes model is presented in the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 4: The sensitivity of the price of derivatives, ⇡, to a change in underlying param-
eters, S and t, on which is dependent, in the presence of oligopolistic competition in the underlying
and derivative assets, is given by:
4 = @⇡
@S
= e(↵⇡ ↵S)(T t)N(d1)
⇥ =
@⇡
@t
=  (r¯f   ↵⇡)Ke (r¯f ↵⇡)(T t)N(d2)
⌫ =
@⇡
@ 
=
p
T   tSe(↵⇡ ↵S)(T t)N(d1)
  =
@2⇡
@S2
=
@4
@S
=
e(↵⇡ ↵S)(T t)
S 
p
T   t N
0(d1)
.
It can be noted that results vary from the traditional greek analysis when oligopolistic compe-
tition is considered. From Proposition 4 it is clear that all values are consistent with a call paying
dividends equal to ↵s ↵⇡ at a rate rf ↵⇡. As we established above, more investment in the asset
with market power, and more market power, imply a lower return valuation for the asset in the
underlying market ↵s and derivative market ↵⇡, which in turn modifies the risk free rate in each
market respectively, as a dividend would do it. In the next section these results are numerically
shown.
3 Some numerical illustrations
In order to explore the importance of the stock and derivative potential market imperfections in the
option valuation some numerical simulations are carried out, considering the following parameters:
K = 100, S = K, t = 0.0, T = 0.5,   = 0.3 and r = 0.05. In table 2, it is possible to see how
the option price varies, given diﬀerent values of ↵⇡ and ↵S . Clearly for the case ↵⇡ = ↵S = 0 the
Black and Scholes valuations are obtained, and the value reached is 9.63.
Our simulations show that higher levels of market power in the derivative markets (↵⇡) tend
to increase the call option values compared with those values given by the standard Black and
Scholes formulation. In contrast, the impact of market power in the underlying asset market (↵S)
tends to lower the option price, see Table 2.
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Table 2. Option pricing considering ↵S and ↵⇡ variations
↵⇡
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0 9.63 10.12 10.64 11.19 11.76 12.37 13.00 13.67 14.37 15.11 15.88
0.1 6.98 7.34 7.72 8.12 8.53 8.97 9.43 9.91 10.42 10.96 11.52
0.2 4.90 5.15 5.42 5.70 5.99 6.30 6.62 6.96 7.31 7.69 8.08
0.3 3.32 3.49 3.67 3.86 4.06 4.27 4.49 4.72 4.96 5.21 5.48
0.4 2.17 2.28 2.40 2.52 2.65 2.79 2.93 3.08 3.24 3.40 3.58
↵S 0.5 1.36 1.43 1.50 1.58 1.66 1.75 1.84 1.93 2.03 2.14 2.25
0.6 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.95 1.00 1.05 1.11 1.16 1.22 1.29 1.35
0.7 0.47 0.50 0.525 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.74 0.78
0.8 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.43
0.9 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.23
1.0 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11
In Table 3, it is shown the oligopolistic option pricing model now considering variations in r¯f ,
besides diﬀerent values of ↵S . In general, higher values of r¯f produce higher option prices.
Table 3. Option pricing considering ↵S and r¯f variations
r¯f
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 9.63 9.88 10.13 10.39 10.65 10.91 11.17 11.44 11.71 11.98
0.2 6.99 7.19 7.40 7.61 7.82 8.04 8.25 8.48 8.70 8.93
0.3 4.91 5.07 5.23 5.39 5.56 5.74 5.91 6.09 6.27 6.46
0.4 3.33 3.45 3.57 3.70 3.83 3.96 4.09 4.23 4.37 4.52
↵S 0.5 2.17 2.26 2.35 2.44 2.54 2.63 2.73 2.84 2.94 3.05
0.6 1.37 1.43 1.49 1.55 1.62 1.69 1.76 1.83 1.91 1.99
0.7 0.82 0.86 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.04 1.09 1.14 1.19 1.24
0.8 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.71 0.75
0.9 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.43
1.0 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24
Figure 1 shows the diﬀerence between the modified Black and Scholes, which considers diﬀerent
values of ↵⇡ and ↵S , and the standard Black and Scholes results, without market power. Investors
should keep these conclusions and intuition in mind if they suspect deviations from the equilibrium
returns, caused by market power, as those experienced during the last financial crisis. It is impor-
tant to point out that this model can be calibrated empirically using the CAPM, through the alpha
term. In Figure 2 and Figure 3, the diﬀerences between the modified Black and Scholes and the
standard Black and Scholes results are presented, now considering r¯f variations. As we already
saw, the impacts of imperfections in the derivative market tend to increase the option valuation,
while the market power of the underlying asset market tend to lower the variation, regardless the
interest rate.
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4 Conclusions and Further Research
We have extended the classical Black and Scholes approach in order to take into account imperfect
market settings. Option valuation models are usually based on a frictionless market, however, as it
has been established in the literature review, the behavior of some financial instruments suggests the
existence of diﬀerent kinds of market imperfections, specially when regarding the events ocurred
during the recent financial crises. In this work an oligopolistic market power setting has been
explored.
In particular in this paper a simple model of option pricing has been developed in which the
derivative and the underlying assets present some level of market power, that produces a lower
level of expected returns on these assets that goes below their fundamental value, and hence aﬀects
the option valuation. Our formulation extends the standard Black-Scholes model to account for
market power in the derivative and the underlying asset markets.
One of the advantages of this formulation, besides its simplicity and theoretical consistency with
the standard Black-Scholes model, is that since abnormal returns can be econometrically estimated
through CAPM, it allows us to analyze the quantitative consequences of market frictions on the
option pricing, which ensures that the results of this work are easy to use in practice.
Our simulations show that higher levels of market power in the option markets tend to increase
the call option values compared with those values given by the standard Black and Scholes formu-
lation. In addition, the impact of market power in the underlying asset market (↵S) tends to lower
the option price. Let us remember that in our formulation the alpha term represents the level of
market power, in other words, the ability of big firms to influence market prices.
These results can be useful to investors if they suspect deviations from the equilibrium returns,
as those experienced in the last financial crisis. Indeed, financial analysts could benefit from an
option pricing model that admits for some type of disequilibrium, in terms for example of abnormal
returns in the derivative and underlying assets markets, specially considering the current levels of
concentrations experienced in financial markets as well as in some of the underlying asset markets.
Further research in this area could point towards incorporating more elements of strategic
interaction among big firms in financial markets, as well as more sophisticated game theoretic ap-
proaches. Finally, these models could be easily tested empirically, using current financial databases.
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